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1 INTRODUCTION 
 Problem Statement 
Long-span guardrail systems have been recognized as an effective means of shielding low-
fill culverts. These designs are popular due to their ability to safely shield the culvert while creating 
minimal construction effort and limiting culvert damage and repair when compared to other 
systems requiring post attachment to the top of the culvert [1-3]. However, previous long-span 
designs were limited by the need to use long sections of nested guardrail [4-9] to prevent rail 
rupture and the need for to provide large lateral offsets between the barrier and the culvert headwall 
[10-11]. The Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) long-span guardrail eliminated those two 
shortcomings by applying the benefits of the MGS to a long-span design [12-13]. The MGS long-
span allowed for increased vehicle capture and stability through increased rail height, limited the 
potential for pocketing and wheel snag through the use of Controlled Release Terminal (CRT) 
posts adjacent to the unsupported span, and greatly increased the tensile capacity of the rail through 
the movement of splices away from the posts and the use of shallower post embedment. These 
features gave the MGS long-span guardrail the ability to perform safely without nested rail, and 
the minimal barrier offset made this new barrier a very functional and safe option for the protection 
of low-fill culverts. 
In a previous study conducted by Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) [14], two 
full-scale crash tests were performed on the MGS long-span guardrail with a span length of 31.25 
ft (9.5 m), as shown in Figure 1. Both crash tests utilized pickup trucks weighing approximately 
5,000 lb (2,268 kg) as per Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) [15] test designation 
no. 3-11. The target impact conditions for the test were a speed of 62 mph (100 km/h) and an angle 
of 25 degrees. The first test was conducted to evaluate the potential for vehicle instability by 
selecting a critical impact point (CIP) that maximized vehicle extension over the culvert and the 
potential for interaction of the front wheel of the pickup truck with the wing wall of the culvert. 
The second test was designed to evaluate the structural capacity of the system. These tests utilized 
Universal Breakaway Steel Posts (UBSPs) adjacent to the long span in lieu of the CRT wood posts 
previously tested [16].  
The current report is based on the results and findings of the second full-scale crash test 
mentioned above. In test no. MGSLS-2, the CIP was selected near the downstream end of the 
unsupported span in order to evaluate the structural capacity of the system. After impacting the 
barrier system, the downstream anchor failed and caused the vehicle to penetrate the barrier 
system. Due to the failure of test no. MGSLS-2, further testing and design refinements are 
necessary on the MGS long-span guardrail for lengths over the 25 ft (7.6 m) span length.  
Based on this failure event, an investigation was required to determine which potential 
factors may have caused the anchor failure. Thus, an anchor failure analysis was conducted for 
test no. MGSLS-2 in this report. The report discusses the factors effecting the failure of the anchor 
system and a brief discussion on the possible solutions for reducing the potential for anchor failure. 
Recommendations for potential design refinements and future testing were developed as well. 
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Figure 1. MGS Long-Span Guardrail, 31.25-ft (9.5-m) Unsupported Span 
 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research effort was to conduct an anchor failure analysis for test no. 
MGSLS-2, which was conducted as part of testing the increased span length for the MGS long-
span guardrail. The various factors potentially affecting the end anchorage failure were identified 
and analyzed through the available data from test no. MGSLS-2 and other applicable full scale 
crash tests. Based on the failure analysis results, potential solutions to the anchor failure are 
provided. 
 Scope 
The objective of the research was achieved by the completion of several tasks. First, the 
failure mechanisms of the downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 were documented and 
reviewed. Next, possible contributing factors to the anchor failure were identified and compared 
with other previous full-scale crash tests of MGS systems. These factors included but were not 
limited to: increased span length, position of CIP, the use of UBSPs adjacent to unsupported 
guardrail span, soil forces, and wood strength variability. Finally, potential solutions and 
recommendations for further design refinement and testing were provided for reducing the 
potential for anchor failure.  
Test Installation UBSP Post 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the results of full-scale crash tests previously conducted on MGS are briefly 
described. The purpose was to review and compare these full-scale crash test results with test no. 
MGSLS-2 to provide insight into possible causes for the downstream end anchorage failure. Note 
that the selected tests were chosen because they are similar to the increased span length MGS long-
span guardrail and/or represent significant loading of the guardrail system anchorages. The 
comparison of test results for MGS full scale crash tests is presented in Table 1. The anchor failure 
analysis results and discussions, along with the comparison with other MGS long-span guardrails, 
will be provided in subsequent chapters.  
Table 1. Comparison of Test Results – MGS Full-Scale Crash Tests 
Evaluation Criteria MGSLS-1 MGSLS-2 LSC-1 LSC-2 MGSMP-1 MGSMIN-1 WIDA-1 
Vehicle Test Inertial 
Mass, lb 
4955 4912 4992 4984 4934 4956 5002 
Impact Speed, mph 62.6 61.4 62.4 61.9 63.4 63.1 63 
Impact Angle, deg 25.9 26.3 24.8 24.9 25.3 24.9 26.4 
Exit Angle, deg 13.3 – 1 18.8 14 – 4.2 
Dynamic Deflection, 
inches 
61.6 164.2 92.2 77.5 49.0 42.2 390.6 
Working Width, inches 64.6 – 93.4 83.9 50.1 48.8 390.6 
Max. Roll, deg -13.1 -15.65 – – 11.79 6.5 10.2 
Max. Pitch, deg -4.0 16.62 – – -5.12 -5 4.5 
OIV – Longitudinal, ft/s 
– Lateral, ft/s 
-12.92 
11.64 
-13.22 
3.16 
-9.6 
10.6 
-16.1 
13.4 
-13.63 
-14.08 
-15.9 
14.0 
-14.56 
-15.13 
ORA – Longitudinal, g’s 
– Lateral, g’s 
-15.76 
6.13 
-23.68 
10.57 
-6.48 
5.91 
-7.34 
4.24 
-10.29 
-7.94 
-8.1 
5.7 
-8.01 
-6.31 
 
 Test No. MGSLS-1 
The MGS long-span guardrail with increased unsupported span length was evaluated to 
MASH standards through two full-scale crash tests conducted under test designation no. 3-11 [14]. 
For test no. MGSLS-1, a CIP was selected that maximized the lateral extension of the vehicle over 
the culvert and promoted increased vehicle interaction with the downstream end of the culvert 
headwall. The barrier consisted of a 175-ft (53.3-m) long MGS system that incorporated a 31.25-
ft (9.5-m) unsupported guardrail span with three UBSPs installed adjacent to each end of the 
unsupported span to reduce the potential for vehicle snag and rail pocketing. A trailing end 
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anchorage designed to replicate the capacity of a tangent guardrail terminal was used on each end 
of the system and consisted of BCT timber posts, anchor cable, and two foundation tubes 
connected by a ground strut. All posts were spaced at 75 in. (1,905 mm) on center. The 31.25 ft 
(9.5 m) unsupported span located near the center of the guardrail installation bridged a simulated 
concrete culvert. Test no. MGSLS-1 was selected for comparison with test no. MGSLS-2 because 
they were identical systems with different impact points. In test no. MGSLS-1, the 4,955 lb (2,248 
kg) pickup truck impacted the MGS long-span guardrail at a speed of 62.7 mph (100.9 km/h), an 
angle of 25.3 degrees, and at a location 1¾ in. (44 mm) downstream of post no. 11, resulting in an 
impact severity of 124.1 kip-ft (168.2 kJ). After impacting the barrier system, the vehicle exited 
the system at a speed of 27.3 mph (44.0 km/h) and an angle of 13.3 degrees. The vehicle was 
successfully contained and smoothly redirected with moderate damage to both the barrier system 
and the vehicle. The dynamic deflection was 61.6 in (1,564 mm) and working width was 64.6 in 
(1,641 mm). All vehicle decelerations fell within the recommended safety limits established in 
MASH, and test no. MGSLS-1 was deemed successful according to the safety criteria of MASH 
test designation 3-11.  
 Test No. LSC-1 
The original MGS long-span guardrail system was capable of traversing culverts with an 
unsupported span 25.0 ft (7.62 m) in length and was evaluated through two full-scale crash tests, 
test nos. LSC-1 and LSC-2 [12-13]. Test no. LSC-1 was intended to evaluate the system at a critical 
impact point that maximized the potential for pocketing, wheel snag, and rail rupture. The MGS 
long-span guardrail system in test no. LSC-1 consisted of 181.25 ft (55.25 m) of standard 12-gauge 
W-beam guardrail supported by steel posts and six CRT posts. The tested barrier was similar to 
the system tested in test no. MGSLS-2 except for a shorter unsupported span length and the use of 
CRT posts rather than UBSPs adjacent to the unsupported span. For test no. LSC-1, the simulated 
culvert headwall consisted of a 9.0-in. thick x 48.0-in. tall (229-mm thick x 1,219-mm tall) 
reinforced concrete wall installed 12.0 in. (305 mm) behind the back of the CRT posts in the 
system. Anchorage systems similar to those used on tangent guardrail terminals were utilized on 
both the upstream and downstream ends of the guardrail system. The entire system was constructed 
with twenty-six guardrail posts. Dissimilarities between test no. LSC-1 and test no. MGSLS-2 
included different impact points and terrain adjacent to the culvert. Test no. MGSLS-2 impacted 
approximately 6 ft (1.83 m) closer to the first post on the downstream end of the unsupported span. 
LSC-1 was evaluated on level terrain while MGSLS-2 had a 3:1 slope offset 2 ft (610 mm) behind 
the system. In test no. LSC-1, a 4,992-lb (2,264-kg) pickup truck impacted the MGS long-span 
guardrail system at a speed of 62.5 mph (100.5 km/h) and at an angle of 24.8 degrees. Vehicle 
impact occurred 8.0 ft (2.44 m) downstream from the centerline of post no. 13. In test no. LSC-1, 
showed that the MGS long-span guardrail adequately contained and redirected the vehicle with 
controlled lateral displacements of the guardrail. The dynamic deflection was 92.2 in (2,342 mm) 
and the working width was 93.4 in (2,372 mm). Therefore, test no. LSC-1 conducted on the MGS 
long-span guardrail system was deemed successful according to the safety criteria of MASH test 
designation no.  3-11. 
 Test No. LSC-2 
Test no. LSC-2 was conducted to evaluate the hazard posed by an impact that maximized 
the interaction between the vehicle and the culvert wing walls. The design of the MGS long-span 
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guardrail used for test no. LSC-1 remained unchanged for test no. LSC-2, but modifications were 
made to the design of the culvert and the lateral offset between the guardrail and the culvert 
headwall. For test no. LSC-2, the simulated culvert was installed flush with the back of the CRT 
posts in the system and a 3:1 slope was implemented 2 ft (610 mm) behind the guardrail posts. In 
test no. LSC-2, a 4,984-lb (2,261-kg) pickup truck impacted the MGS long-span guardrail system 
at a speed of 61.9 mph (99.6 km/h) and at an angle of 24.9 degrees at a CIP chosen to maximize 
the interaction of the impacting vehicle with the walls of the culvert. Vehicle impact occurred 
41.24 ft (12.57 m) upstream from the centerline of post no. 14. Test no. LSC-2 demonstrated that 
the MGS long-span guardrail adequately contained and redirected the vehicle with controlled 
lateral displacements of the guardrail. The dynamic deflection was 77.5 in (1,969 mm) and the 
working width was 83.9 in (2,131 mm). It was noted that the occupant impact velocities (OIV) and 
occupant ride-down decelerations (ORD) were within the suggested limits. Therefore, test no. 
LSC-2 conducted on the MGS long-span guardrail system was deemed successful according to the 
safety criteria of MASH test designation no. 3-11 [12]. 
 Test No. MGSMP-1 
The test installation for MGS with one omitted post consisted of 182 ft – 3½ in. (55.6 m) 
of standard 31-in. tall W-beam guardrail supported by steel posts. A single full-scale crash test, 
test no. MGSMP-1, was conducted with the 2270P pickup truck to evaluate the MGS with one 
omitted post in accordance with MASH test no. 3-11. The test installation utilized standard 6-ft 
(1.8-m) long steel guardrail posts with 12-in. (305-mm) deep blockouts. All posts were spaced at 
75 in. (1,905 mm) on center, except for a single 150-in. (3,810-mm) span located near the center 
of the guardrail installation, which represented the omitted post in the otherwise standard MGS. 
Test no. MGSMP-1 was chosen for comparison with test no. MGSLS-2 based on its use of an 
unsupported span and the potential for similar increases in rail load and barrier pocketing. Test no. 
MGSMP-1 consisted of a 4,934-lb (2,238-kg) pickup truck impacting the MGS with an omitted 
post at a speed of 63.4 mph (102.1 km/h) and an angle of 25.3 degrees. The vehicle was contained 
and smoothly redirected with only moderate damage sustained by the system and the vehicle. The 
dynamic deflection was 49 in (1,245 mm) and working width was 50.1 in (1,273 mm). The vehicle 
remained upright, and all vehicle decelerations were within the recommended occupant risk limits 
[17].  
 Test No. MGSMIN-1 
The recommended minimum length for the standard MGS had historically been 175 ft 
(55.3 m) based on crash testing according to NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH. A research study 
was undertaken to evaluate the effects of reducing the system length of the MGS. The research 
study included one full-scale crash test, test no. MGSMIN-1, in which a Dodge Ram pickup truck 
impacted a 75-ft (22.9-m) long MGS. This test was selected for comparison with test no. MGSLS-
2 based on the potential for increased end anchor loading in the reduced length system. 
Test no. MGSMIN-1, was performed on the MGS with a top rail mounting height of 31 in. 
(787 mm). The system incorporated 72-in. (1,829-mm) long, W6x8.5 (W152x12.6) steel posts 
with an embedment depth of 40 in. (1,016 mm). End anchorage systems, similar to those used on 
tangent guardrail terminals, were utilized on both the upstream and downstream ends of the 
guardrail system. The test consisted of a 4,956-lb (2,248 kg) pickup truck impacting the barrier 
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system at a speed of 63.1 mph (101.6 km/h) and at an angle of 24.9 degrees. Initial vehicle impact 
was to occur at the center line of post no. 4, and the actual point of impact was 4 in. (102 mm) 
downstream of post no. 4. During the test, the vehicle was contained and smoothly redirected 
without any significant snagging or pocketing. The maximum permanent set and dynamic 
deflections were 36⅜ in. (924 mm) and 42.2 in. (1,072 mm), respectively. The working width of 
the system was 48.8 in. (1,240 mm). The test results were found to meet all the MASH safety 
requirements for test designation no. 3-11 [18]. 
 Test No. WIDA-1 
A non-proprietary, downstream end anchorage system for 31-in. (787-mm) tall guardrail 
was crash tested and evaluated according to the MASH impact safety standards [19]. The 
anchorage was an adaptation of the original modified BCT anchor system, but it was installed 
tangent. It consisted of two BCT timber posts set into 6-in. wide x 8-in. deep x 72-in. long (152-
mm x 203-mm x 1,829-mm) steel foundation tubes. The two steel foundation tubes were connected 
at the ground line through a strut and yoke assembly. A ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter 6x19 wire rope 
connected the back of the W-beam to the bottom of the end post. The test installation consisted of 
181 ft – 3 in. (55.2 m) of MGS along with the end anchorage system noted previously on each end. 
The system was constructed with twenty-nine posts. Post nos. 3 through 27 were galvanized, 
ASTM A36, W6x8.5 (W152x12.6) sections measuring 72 in. (1,829 mm) longTwo full-scale crash 
tests were performed on the system under MASH modified designation no. 3-37. Test no. WIDA-
1 was conducted with a 5,172-lb (2,346-kg) pickup truck to identify the end of the LON, while test 
no. WIDA-2 was conducted with a 2,619-lb (1,188-kg) small passenger car to assess any potential 
vehicle instability. Test No. WIDA-1 was selected for comparison with test no. MGSLS-2 based 
on the potential for increased anchor loads due to impact of a 2270P vehicle near the end of the 
system.  
In test no. WIDA-1, the 2270P vehicle impacted the 31-in. (787-mm) high MGS barrier at 
the centerline of the sixth post upstream from the trailing-end terminal (i.e., post no. 24) with an 
initial impact speed and angle of 63.0 mph (101.4 km/h) and 26.4 degrees, respectively. Both the 
downstream anchor BCT wood posts fractured before direct contact with the 2270P pickup truck 
could occur. Due to the early fracture of the end post, the anchor cable was released before the 
vehicle became parallel to the barrier system. After the BCT wood posts fractured, the pickup truck 
continued yawing while proceeding downstream, with the rear wheels skidding and the front 
wheels still in contact with the ground and redirecting the vehicle. The front wheels realigned after 
the vehicle was downstream of the end post, and the pickup truck proceeded along a straight path 
until eventually coming to a complete stop facing downstream. The dynamic deflection was 390.6 
in (9921 mm) and the working width was 390.6 in (9921 mm). Test no. WIDA-1 was determined 
to be acceptable according to the MASH safety performance criteria for modified test designation 
no. 3-37.  
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3 ANCHOR FAILURE ANALYSIS OF TEST NO. MGSLS-2 
An engineering analysis was undertaken to review the anchor failure observed in test no. 
MGSLS-2. The analysis reviewed a variety of factors that may have contributed to the anchor 
failure. The analysis also compared critical aspects of the barrier performance with previous full-
scale crash tests that had similar features or increased anchor loading. The results of this analysis 
and conclusions regarding potential causes of the anchor failure are presented in the subsequent 
sections. Possible modifications to the barrier system to mitigate the anchor failure will be 
presented the next chapter. 
The original MASH MGS long-span guardrail (LSC test series) provided the capability to 
span unsupported lengths up to 25 ft with wood CRT post near the span. The MGS long-span 
guardrail (MGSLS tests) consisted of a 31.25-ft span MGS with the wood CRT posts near the span 
replaced by UBSPs. The test installation layout for test no. MGSLS-2 is shown in Figure 2. Full 
system details can be found in the research report [14]. Two critical impact points CIP's were 
determined for this system and tested with the 2270P truck. The only dissimilarity between test 
nos. MGSLS-1 and MGSLS-2 was the impact location. For test no. MGSLS-2, the CIP was 
selected to maximize the potential for pocketing, wheel snag, and rail rupture [16]. The test 
installation for the MGS long-span guardrails was composed of 175 ft (53.3 m) of standard W-
beam guardrail supported by BCT timber posts, standard steel posts, UBSPs, and the concrete 
culvert. All posts were spaced at 75 in. (1,905 mm) on center. A single 31.25 ft (9.5 m) unsupported 
span located near the center of the guardrail installation bridged a simulated concrete culvert.  
 Anchor Components in MGSLS-2 
The MGS long-span end-anchorage system consists of the following components, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
1. Two MGS BCT posts 
2. Soil foundation tubes  
3. Cable anchor assembly  
4. Guardrail 
5. C-channel ground line strut 
6. Load cell assembly 
The MGS BCT posts were installed in steel soil foundation tubes, which were embedded 
to a depth of 70 in. (1778 mm). A BCT cable assembly was attached to the post by inserting a 
swaged end of the cable into the BCT hole and through a bearing plate, and attached to the guardrail 
using a cable anchor bracket. The guardrail was attached to the BCT posts with a top mounting 
height of 31 in. (787 mm). A bent plate, C-shape, ground line strut was used to connect the two 
soil foundation tubes [20]. For test no. MGSLS-2, anchor cable on each end of the system was 
spliced with a 50-kip load cell assembly. The load cell had been spliced into the anchor cable in a 
variety of past guardrail tests with no adverse effect on anchor capacity, and the incorporation of 
the load cell provided valuable anchor load data.  
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Figure 2. Test Installation Layout, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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 MGSLS-2 Anchor Failure  
In test no. MGSLS-2, the 4,912-lb (2,228-kg) pickup truck impacted the MGS long-span 
guardrail at a speed of 61.4 mph (98.8 km/h), an angle of 26.3 degrees, and at a location 239.71 
in. (6,093 mm) downstream from post no. 13, which resulted in an impact severity of 110.7 kip-ft 
(150.0 kJ). During the test, the downstream anchor system failed and allowed the rail to disengage 
from the posts and become wrapped around the vehicle. The vehicle penetrated beyond the barrier 
and came to rest 17 ft – 9 in. (5.4 m) behind the system and 44 ft – 9 in. (13.6 m) downstream from 
the point of impact. A summary of the sequential photographs is shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
Following the initial impact of the 2270P vehicle with the W-beam rail, the W-beam rail 
captured the pickup truck and began to redirect the vehicle. The guardrail deflected laterally, which 
caused the first UBSP downstream of impact, post no. 14, to fracture at 0.078 sec after impact. 
The vehicle continued to be redirected, and deflected the guardrail and the second UBSP 
downstream of impact, post no. 15, laterally.  
As the vehicle was redirected, the BCT posts at the downstream end anchorage, post nos. 
24 and 25, were deflected longitudinally upstream due to tensile loads in the guardrail and the 
cable anchorage. Vertical cracking in post no. 24 was initiated at approximately 0.095 sec due to 
longitudinal loading of the post through the post bolt connecting the post to the guardrail, as shown 
in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As loading of the downstream anchorage continued, a diagonal crack 
initiated near the top of the BCT cable anchor plate on the downstream face of post no. 25. This 
crack propagated down to the hole in the base of the BCT post and caused complete fracture and 
release of post no. 25 at approximately 0.140 sec after impact. Following the release of the cable 
anchorage at post no. 25, post no. 24 fractured and released as well. Release of the downstream 
end anchorage caused the guardrail to lose tensile on the downstream end of the system and 
allowed the 2270P vehicle to penetrate into the barrier system in an uncontrolled manner.  
Wood post damage included fracturing, gouging, and displacement of posts. Post no. 1 had 
gouging on the front face due to rail contact. Post no. 2 split vertically along the height of the post 
through the guardrail bolt hole on the front side. Post nos. 24 and 25 fractured at the ground line 
and post no. 24 also split along the vertical plane of the centerline of the post. Post no. 25 had a 
7½-in. (191-mm) deep by 3-in. (76-mm) wide crack located 2¼ in. (57 mm) downward from the 
top of the back face of the post, as well as a 3-in. (76-mm) diameter dent on the back downstream 
face of the post. The post-test photographs of the end anchorage system for test no. MGSLS-2 are 
shown in Figure 8. No knots or asperities were observed in the fracture region of post no. 25, as 
shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 3. Long-Span End-Anchorage System, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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 Analysis of Parameters Related to Downstream Anchorage Failure 
Following the failure of test no. MGSLS-2, the researchers analyzed a variety of parameters 
related to the downstream anchor failure in order to provide insight into the cause of the failure. 
These parameters are listed below. 
1. Loading and deflection of the end anchorage 
2. Behavior of the breakaway posts adjacent to the unsupported span prior to failure 
3. Rail pocketing  
4. Location of the vehicle impact point 
5. Barrier deflection prior to failure 
6. Rail release from the posts prior to failure 
7. Vehicle trajectory prior to failure 
8. Soil strength  
9. Variability of wood 
Each of these parameters was investigated with respect to test no. MGSLS-2. In addition, similar 
parameters from other relevant MGS full-scale crash tests were analyzed for comparison purposes. 
It should also be noted that test no. MGSLS-2 had a 3:1 slope installed at a 2 ft (610 mm) 
offset from the back of the system posts, while test no. LSC-1 was installed on level terrain. The 
difference in grading behind the two systems was not believed to be a factor in the end anchorage 
failure as the anchor broke prior to vehicle engagement with the slope and sufficient backfill was 
provided behind the posts prior to the 3:1 slope to ensure that post-soil forces would not be affected 
by the presence of the slope. 
The following full-scale crash tests of the MGS were utilized for comparison, as noted in 
Chapter 2. 
1. Increased MGS long span – MGSLS-1 
2. MGS long span – LSC-1, LSC-2 
3. MGS minimum length – MGSMIN-1 
4. MGS downstream anchor – WIDA-1 
5. MGS omitted post – MGSMP-1  
The results of the analysis of each of the anchor failure parameters investigated are detailed in the 
subsequent sections.  
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Figure 4. Sequential Photographs, Test No. MGSLS-2 
September 29, 2017  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-362-17 
 
13 
 
0.000 sec 
 
0.030 sec 
 
0.094 sec 
 
0.190 sec 
 
0.554 sec 
 
1.840 sec 
 
0.000 sec 
 
0.076 sec 
 
0.152 sec 
 
0.266 sec 
 
0.400 sec 
 
0.744 sec 
 
Figure 5. Sequential Photographs, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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Figure 6. Sequential Photographs of Downstream End Anchorage, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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Figure 7. Sequential Photographs of Downstream End Anchorage, Test No. MGSLS-2, Cont. 
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Figure 8. Post-Test Photographs of End Anchorage System, Test No. MGSLS-2  
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Figure 9. Post No. 25 Damage, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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3.3.1 Anchor Loads and Deflection  
Analysis of the anchor failure began with a comparison the load and deflection of the 
downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 with other available data from tests of similar 
end anchorages. Figures 11 through 18 show a sequential comparison between the loading and 
deflection of the downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 and other similar anchorages 
under full-scale testing impacts with 2270P vehicles, including the upstream end anchorages from 
test nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and MGSMIN-1 and the downstream end anchorage from 
MGSLS-1. Review of the sequential images found that all of the anchorages displayed similar 
deflection behavior in terms of deflection downstream due to the tensile loading of the W-beam 
rail. The vertical splitting of post no. 24 in test no. MGSLS-2 was not a singular event as test nos. 
MGSLS-2 and MGSMP-1 demonstrated similar behavior on the upstream anchors, but did not fail. 
Motion of the cable end plate was also reviewed for all of the tests and no abnormal deflection or 
rotation of the cable end plate was noted in test no. MGSLS-2 prior to the anchorage failure as 
compared to the other tests.  
Film analysis was used to compare the deflection angle of the posts from vertical as the 
anchorages were loaded, as shown in Figures 18 and 19. Note that the deflection angle of the 
second BCT post from vertical for in test no. MGSLS-2 was not measured after the vertical 
splitting of the anchor post, and the angle of the first BCT post in test no. MGSLS-2 increased 
rapidly after 0.120 sec due to the formation of the crack near the top of the cable anchor plate noted 
previously. Comparison of the deflection angles found that the deflection of the BCT posts in the 
downstream anchor from test no. MGSLS-2 was not markedly different or excessive as compared 
to previous tests without anchor failure prior to fracture of the anchor posts. 
Anchor load and deflection were also compared. The upstream end anchorages in test nos. 
MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and MGSMIN-1 as well as the downstream anchorages in test nos. 
MGSLS-1 and MGSLS-2 were instrumented with 50-kip tension load cells spliced in line with the 
end anchor cable. Additionally, string pots were attached to the base of the foundation tube on the 
final post for measurement of linear displacement of the anchorage in the longitudinal direction. 
These transducers allowed for comparisons of the load and deflection of these anchorages. 
The anchor loading of failed test no. MGSLS-2 was reviewed first. Anchor load versus 
time and anchor load versus foundation tube deflection for the upstream end anchorage and the 
downstream end anchorage that failed in test no. MGSLS-2 are shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21, 
respectively. The downstream anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 developed a peak load of 27.5 kips 
(122.3 kN) at approximately 1.6 in. (41 mm) of deflection prior to failure of post no. 25 and release 
of the anchor cable. The upstream anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 developed a peak load of 24.4 
kips (108.5 kN) at approximately 1.8 in. (46 mm) of deflection, but the upstream end anchorage 
did not show any signs of anchor failure. Thus, similar load and deflection were observed in the 
upstream and downstream anchorages, but only the downstream anchorage failed.  
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Figure 10. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
   MGSLS-2 Downstream 
 
   MGSLS-2 Upstream 
 
1  
2  
24  25  
   MGSLS-1 Downstream 
 
   MGSMP-1 Upstream 
 
   MGSMIN-1 Upstream 
 
September 29, 2017  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-362-17 
 
20 
Time = 0.025 Sec 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 11. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
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Figure 12. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
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Figure 13. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
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Figure 14. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests 
   MGSLS-2 Downstream 
 
   MGSLS-1 Downstream 
 
   MGSLS-2 Upstream 
 
   MGSMP-1 Upstream 
 
   MGSMIN-1 Upstream 
 
25  
24  
2  
1  
September 29, 2017  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-362-17 
 
24 
Time = 0.125 sec 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 15. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
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Figure 16. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests
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Figure 17. End Anchorage Sequential View Comparison of MGS Tests 
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Failure of an instrumented end anchorage assembly had not been observed in any full-scale 
crash tests prior to test no. MGSLS-2. However, dynamic component testing of end anchorages 
was conducted as part of the development of trailing end anchor requirements for the MGS [19]. 
As part of this research, the same end anchorage used in test no. MGSLS-2 was subjected to a 
dynamic pull test using the MwRSF heavy bogie vehicle, as shown in Figure 22. In test no. DSAP-
2, the end anchorage was loaded until the final BCT post fractured at the base and released the 
anchor cable, as shown in Figure 23. This was a very similar failure mode to that observed in test 
no. MGSLS-2. Anchor cable load versus deflection of the foundation tube is shown in Figure 24. 
The end anchorage in test no. DSAP-2 developed a peak load of 34.6 kips (153.9 kN) at 
approximately 0.9 in. (23 mm) of deflection prior to failure the final BCT post and release of the 
anchor cable. The loads observed in test no. DSAP-2 were 25.8% higher than those observed in 
test no. MGSLS-2 and indicated that the end anchorage that failed during test no. MGSLS-2 had 
the potential to develop significantly higher end anchor loads prior to failure.  
In order to further investigate, a comparison of the anchor load versus time and anchor load 
versus foundation tube deflection for the available upstream and downstream anchor data from test 
nos. MGSLS-1, MGSMIN-1, and WIDA-1 were compared with the results from the failed 
downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2. The results were divided between upstream and 
downstream anchor data, and the comparisons are shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26. Review of 
the upstream end anchor load versus deflection data from the selected tests found that the peak 
upstream end anchor load was similar to or less than several previous full-scale crash tests, 
including test nos. MGSMIN-1 and MGSLS-1. This would suggest that the tensile rail loads 
developed in test no. MGSLS-2 were not excessive as compared to previous MGS barrier tests that 
did not experience anchor failure. It was also noted that the upstream end anchorage in test no. 
MGSLS-1 developed a peak load of 34.0 kips (151.2 kN) without anchor failure, which was 23.6% 
more than the measured peak load in the downstream end anchorage that failed in test no. MGSLS-
2. The load versus deflection plot also displayed similar slopes for the four tests. Test nos. MGSLS-
2, MGSLS-1, and WIDA-1 had very similar slopes, while test no. MGSMIN-1 displayed increased 
slope during loading of the end anchorage. This would suggest that the upstream anchors had 
similar stiffness in the compared tests.  
Comparison of the downstream end anchorage load versus deflection data from test nos. 
MGSLS-1, MGSMIN-1, and MGSLS-2 showed similar trends. The stiffness or slope of the load 
versus deflection curves were similar for each of the three tests with available data. Additionally, 
test no. MGSLS-1 developed a peak load in the downstream end anchor of 30.9 kips (137.5 kN) 
without failure, which was 12.3% higher than the measured peak load in the downstream end 
anchorage that failed in test no. MGSLS-2. 
Analysis and comparison of the end anchorage load and deflection from test no. MGSLS-
2 and other comparable tests did not identify a potential source of the end anchorage failure 
observed in test no. MGSLS-2. The peak load recorded in the failed anchorage did not appear to 
be excessive when compared with similar full-scale crash tests and did not exceed previous 
dynamic load testing of similar anchorages. The deflection and stiffness of the failed end 
anchorage did not suggest any significant departure from previous anchor testing. Finally, no 
behaviors were noted during loading of the end anchorage that were different from those observed 
in other end anchorages.  
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Figure 18. MGSLS-2 Downstream Anchor Post Motion 
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Figure 19. MGSLS-2 Downstream Anchor Post Motion 
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Figure 20. Anchor Load Vs. Time, Test No. MGSLS-2 
 
Figure 21. Anchor Load Vs. Deflection, Test No. MGSLS-2 
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Figure 22. Dynamic End Anchorage Test Setup, Test No. DSAP-2 
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Figure 23. Time-Sequential Photographs – Front View, Test No. DSAP-2
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Figure 24. Anchor Cable Load vs. Foundation Tube Displacement, Test No. DSAP-2 
 
Figure 25. Upstream Anchor Load vs Deflection, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSLS-1, MGSMIN-1, 
and WIDA-1 
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Figure 26. Downstream Anchor Load vs Deflection, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSLS-1, and 
MGSMIN-1
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3.3.2 Location of Vehicle Impact Point 
Differences between the vehicle impact point of test no. MGSLS-2 and other comparable 
tests were reviewed to determine if the vehicle impact point may have contributed to the failure of 
the downstream end anchorage. The impact point for test no. MGSLS-2 was compared with other 
similar tests with respect to its proximity to the first post downstream of impact, its proximity to 
the first rail splice downstream of impact, and the distance to the downstream end anchorage. It 
was believed that the position of the vehicle impact relative to these critical points may have 
affected the barrier performance and altered the loading of the end anchorage. Impact points for 
test no. MGSLS-2 and several comparable tests are shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28. The impact 
points relative to the first post downstream of impact and the first splice downstream of impact to 
for test no. MGSLS-2 and comparable tests are shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30, respectively. 
Finally, the position of the impact points for each test relative to the location of the downstream 
end anchorage is shown in Figure 31.  
Review of the data found that the impact point for test no. MGSLS-2 fell into the mid-
range with respect to distance to the first post downstream of impact, which suggested that the 
impact point with respect to the first impacted post likely had little effect on loading of the end 
anchorage. However, rail pocketing caused by the impact location relative to a post may have 
increased anchor loads, as noted previously. Similarly, the distance from the impact point to the 
first splice downstream for test no. MGSLS-2 fell into the mid-range of the comparable systems. 
It was noted that in test no. MGSLS-2 the impact was closer to the downstream end anchorage 
than in previous long span guardrail tests and was closer to the end of the guardrail system than 
all comparable tests except test nos. WIDA-1 and MGSMIN-1. Test no. LSC-1 was impacted 
farther from the first post downstream of the unsupported span than test no. MGSLS-2, but no 
concerns with anchor failure were associated with the former test. Test no. WIDA-1 evaluated an 
impact near the end of the redirective length of the MGS with a trailing end terminal. In this test, 
the end anchor failed, but it did not release until the 2270P vehicle had nearly reached the end of 
the barrier system, and high lateral and longitudinal loads were imparted on the trailing end 
anchorage. Thus, the failure mode was not similar to the failure under longitudinal loading 
observed in test no. MGSLS-2. Test no. MGSMIN-1 evaluated a 75-ft (22.9-m) long MGS and 
impacted 56 ft-3 in. (17.1 m) from the end anchorage. However, the 2270P vehicle was safely 
redirected and no failure of the end anchorage occurred as a result of the impact closer to the 
downstream end anchorage. Thus, while the impact point for test no. MGSLS-2 was different as 
compared to previous tests of the MGS and MGS long span, no evidence was found that suggested 
the impact point directly contributed to the anchor failure.  
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MGSLS-2 
 
LSC-1 
 
MGSLS-1 
 
LSC-2 
Figure 27. Impact Point for Test Nos. MGSLS-2, LSC-1, MGSLS-1, and LSC-2 
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Figure 28. Impact Point for Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, MGSMIN-1, and WIDA-2 
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Figure 29. MGS Testing Impact Points Relative to First Post Downstream of Impact 
 
Figure 30. MGS Testing Impact Points Relative to First Splice Downstream of Impact 
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Figure 31. MGS Testing Impact Points Relative to End Anchorage 
3.3.3 Breakaway Post Behavior Adjacent to the Unsupported Span 
The breakaway post behavior adjacent to the unsupported span was analyzed to determine 
whether the use of the UBSP when testing the MGS long-span guardrail with an increased span 
altered the behavior of the system in a manner that may have contributed to the failure of the end 
anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2. The fracture or disengagement of the UBSPs in test no. MGSLS-
2 was compared with the fracture of the CRT posts in previous MGS long span-guardrail test no. 
LSC-1, which utilized a similar impact point on the unsupported span. Because the vehicle impact 
points varied for the compared tests, the post disengagement was recorded as a function of the 
distance from the corner of the impacting vehicle’s front bumper relative to each post at the 
moment it fractured or disengaged, as shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33. This would allow 
comparison of when the post fractured relative to vehicle position for the two tests. The time of 
post fracture for each of the posts was also noted. 
The comparison of post fracture and disengagement in test nos. MGSLS-2 vs LSC-1 is 
shown in Table 2. Review of the data found that the UBSPs in test no. MGSLS-2 broke away when 
the truck was significantly closer to the post as compared to test no. LSC-1. Comparison of post 
breakaway was most relevant for the first breakaway post downstream of the unsupported span in 
each test, as anchor failure occurred in test no. MGSLS-2 prior to breakaway of the second and 
third posts downstream of the unsupported span. The first breakaway post downstream of the 
unsupported span in test no. MGSLS-2 disengaged when the truck was 18.7 in. (475 mm) closer 
as compared to the disengagement of the same post in test no. LSC-1. This may indicate that the 
UBSP provided additional support to the guardrail prior to fracture and may have led to increased 
barrier stiffness and rail pocketing. Another factor in the delayed disengagement of the UBSP post 
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may have been that some of the CRT posts in test no. LSC-1 fractured at the second weakening 
hole in the CRT post below grade, as well as splitting vertically. The UBSP only has a fracture 
mechanism at ground line and is made of steel. Thus, it cannot replicate a failure of the post below 
grade or the vertical splitting observed in test no. LSC-1.  
 
Fracture of First UBSP Downstream of Unsupported Span 
 
Fracture of Second UBSP Downstream of Unsupported Span 
 
Fracture of Third UBSP Downstream of Unsupported Span 
Figure 32. Longitudinal Distance of Fractured Post Relative to 2270P Bumper Corner, Test no. 
MGSLS-2 
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Fracture of First CRT Downstream of Unsupported Span 
 
Fracture of Second CRT Downstream of Unsupported Span 
 
Fracture of Third CRT Downstream of Unsupported Span 
Figure 33. Longitudinal Distance of Fractured Post Relative to 2270P Bumper Corner, Test no. 
LSC-1 
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Table 2. Breakaway Post Fracture 
 
3.3.4 Rail Pocketing 
Rail pocketing is generally defined as the development of a high angle of the redirective 
elements of a longitudinal barrier ahead of an impacting vehicle. Rail pocketing angles are a 
concern due to their potential to affect a system’s ability to safely contain and redirect a test vehicle 
without rupture of the rail components. High rail pocketing angles can lead to increased rail 
loading, vehicle snag, reduced vehicle capture, and increased longitudinal vehicle decelerations. 
For test no. MGSLS-2, there was concern that rail pocketing may have occurred that affected the 
loading of the longitudinal barrier and contributed to the downstream anchor failure. Previous 
research has indicated that the maximum pocketing angle should fall below 23 degrees, which has 
previously been associated with degraded barrier performance, including rail rupture [21]. 
The maximum pocketing angle for test no. MGSLS-2, as well as comparable test nos. 
MGSLS-1 and MGSMP-1, were calculated from analysis of overhead video. Sequential images of 
the overhead video from 0.000 sec to 0.140 sec for test nos. MGSLS-2, LSC-1, and MGSMP-1 
are shown in Figures 34 through 37, and the calculated pocketing angles are shown in Figure 38. 
Note that the calculated pocketing angles shown for test no. MGSLS-2 are only relevant up to the 
point of the downstream end anchor failure at approximately 140 msec after impact. Review of the 
data found that test no. MGSLS-2 initially had slightly higher pocketing angles than test nos. LSC-
1 and MGSMP-1. By 0.040 sec after impact, test no. MGSMP-1 showed a sharp increase in 
pocketing angle due to the vehicle approaching the first standard line post downstream of the 
unsupported span created by the omission of a single post. Test no. MGSLS-2 showed a similar 
increase in pocketing angle as the vehicle approached the first UBSP downstream of the 
unsupported span. The pocketing angle for test no. MGSLS-2 continued to increase until anchor 
failure at approximately 0.140 sec after impact. Test no. MGSLS-2 displayed pocketing angles 
Post Location 
Test No. MGSLS-2 Test No. LSC-1 
Time at Failure 
Post X Distance 
Relative to 
Pickup Bumper 
Corner at Failure 
(in.) 
Time at Failure 
Post X Distance  
Relative to 
Pickup Bumper 
Corner at Failure 
(in.) 
First UBSP/CRT Post 
Downstream of 
Unsupported Span 
0.070 57.4 0.120 
76.1 
Second UBSP/CRT 
Post Downstream of 
Unsupported Span 
0.156 42.7 0.150 
119.6 
Third UBSP/CRT Post 
Downstream of 
Unsupported Span 
0.278 8 0.168 
173.9 
*Note: Test no. MGSLS-2 anchor failure occurs between 0.135 and 0.145 sec into event 
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that were generally greater than those of test no. LSC-1. This was consistent with the earlier 
disengagement of the CRT posts in test no. LSC-1 noted previously, and may potentially indicate 
that rail loading was affected by use of the UBSPs. However, anchor load data was not available 
from test no. LSC-1. The pocketing angles observed for all three tests were less than or very near  
Overhead View –Time = 0.000 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Overhead View at Time = 0.000 sec, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and LSC-1 
    MGSLS-2 
 LSC-1 
MGSMP-1 
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Overhead View –Time = 0.060 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Overhead View at Time = 0.060 sec, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and LSC-1 
    MGSLS-2      
LSC-1 
MGSMP-1 
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Overhead View - Time = 0.120 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Overhead View at Time = 0.120 sec, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and LSC-1 
MGSLS-2 
MGSMP-1 
    LSC-1 
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Overhead View - Time = 0.140 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Overhead View at Time = 0.140 sec, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and LSC-1 
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Figure 38. Pocketing Angle Versus Time, Test Nos. MGSLS-2, MGSMP-1, and LSC-1  
the threshold of 23 degrees that has previously been deemed acceptable. Additionally, the 
maximum pocketing angles for test nos. MGSLS-2 and MGSMP-1 were very similar prior to 
anchor failure, but the end anchor in test no. MGSMP-1 did not fail. The pocketing analysis also 
noted that some kinking of the rail was observed at the first post downstream of the unsupported 
span in test no. MGSLS-2 which was not observed in test nos. MGSMP-1 and LSC-1. This may 
indicate that the UBSP provided additional stiffness prior to fracture and potentially affected rail 
loading as compared the other tested systems. However, the kinking observed was not sufficient 
to believe to be a direct cause of the failure of the end anchorage.  
Thus, the analysis indicated that the rail pocketing observed in test no. MGSLS-2 was more 
than observed in previous testing of the MGS long-span guardrail and may have affected rail 
loading, but the magnitude did not appear to be large enough to indicate a serious concern that 
would lead the researchers to suspect it as the cause of the downstream end anchorage failure. 
Additionally, while pocketing of the guardrail was similar to previous testing rail loading may 
have been affected based on the kinking of the rail prior to anchor failure.  
3.3.5 Barrier Defection 
Similar to the rail pocketing analysis, a comparison of the dynamic rail deflection was 
conducted for test nos. MGSLS-2 and LSC-1 in order to determine if the rail deflection indicated 
potential concerns with respect to the failure of the downstream end anchorage. Test no. LSC-1 
was chosen for comparison purposes as it was a similar crash test on the MGS long-span guardrail 
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with the original unsupported span length. The dynamic rail deflection at various time intervals 
for test nos. MGSLS-2 and LSC-1 is shown in Figures 39 through 42. Test no. MGSLS-2 displayed 
higher rail deflections at each time interval as compared to test no. LSC-1. The increased deflection 
was consistent with the effect of the increased unsupported span length in test no. MGSLS-2 and 
correlated well with the increased pocketing angles noted previously for test no. MGSLS-2. When 
combined with increased rail pocketing, the increased rail deflection observed would suggest that 
the loading of the downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 may have been affected by 
modifications to the barrier as compared to the long-span guardrail evaluated in test no. LSC-1. 
However, the increased rail deflection and pocketing were not believed to be sufficient to 
precipitate the failure of the downstream anchorage. 
3.3.1 Soil Strength  
Variation in the soil strength between crash tests was another potential factor that may have 
contributed to the failure of the downstream end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2. Increased soil 
strength could have affected the loading of the downstream end anchorage by increasing the 
stiffness of the anchorage and reducing the amount of energy absorbed as the anchorage was 
loaded. Under the MASH test criteria, static soil tests are performed prior to all full-scale crash 
tests for comparison with a known baseline soil material to ensure that soil strength is above a 
minimum value. The static soil test data from test no. MGSLS-2 and other comparable tests were 
reviewed to investigate potential soil strength differences.  
A comparison of the force versus deflection data from test nos. MGSLS-2, MGSLS-1, 
MGSMIN-1, and MGSMP-1 is shown in Figure 43. The data showed that the peak load developed 
in the static soil test for test no. MGSLS-2 was similar to that of previous tests. The initial slope 
or stiffness of the soil response was similar as well. The general shape of the curves shown do 
differ from test to test, but all the soil tests reviewed were acceptable under the MASH soil 
requirements for full-scale crash testing. Based on these results, the soil response from test no. 
MGSLS-2 would not have been expected to produce more severe loading of the end anchorage. 
This conclusion would be consistent with the anchor load comparison, which indicated that the 
loading of the end anchor was consistent with previous tests of similar anchorages.  
Static soil tests from the original full-scale crash testing of the MGS long-span guardrail, 
test nos. LSC-1 and LSC-2, were not available for comparison. These tests were conducted during 
the development of the MASH criteria and prior to the development of the static soil testing 
procedure. While there may have been differences in the stiffness and post -soil interaction forces 
when comparing the original and increased span length MGS long-span guardrail testing, it was 
not possible to quantify potential differences in the soil behavior between those systems.  
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Figure 39. Comparison of Deflected Rail Geometries 
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Figure 40. Comparison of Deflected Rail Geometries 
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Figure 41. Comparison of Deflected Rail Geometries 
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Figure 42. Comparison of Deflected Rail Geometries 
 
Figure 43. Static Soil Test Comparisons 
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3.3.2 Wood Variability 
Another potential factor that could have affected the failure of the downstream end 
anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 was the inherent variability of the southern yellow pine (SYP) 
BCT posts used in the anchorage. The strength of SYP can vary for several reasons, including 
natural variations in density, the presence of latewood and earlywood growth rings, and defects 
such as knots, checks, and shakes. Moisture content and other factors may play a role as well. 
Figure 44 shows the variability in tension and compression of SYP clear wood at 12% moisture 
content. The plots show that even clear wood has strengths that vary 50% or more from the median.  
The variation of the timber posts used in the end anchorages has affected anchor capacity 
in previous testing. During the development of a simplified steel post approach guardrail transition 
for the MGS, an initial crash test, test no. MWTSP-1, was performed according to test designation 
no. 3-21 of MASH with a ½–ton Quad Cab pickup truck [22]. During the test, the upstream BCT 
wood anchor posts failed prematurely, causing a loss of tension in the rail which allowed the rail 
to pocket excessively. As a result, the longitudinal occupant ridedown decelerations exceeded the 
recommended safety limits established by MASH. Upon inspection, it was determined that a knot 
located in the critical section of the first BCT wood anchor post led to the premature post failure. 
In order to minimize the effect of wood variability observed in test no. MWTSP-1, MwRSF 
specified that the BCT posts used in full-scale crash tests be Grade No. 1 or better SYP with no 
knots 18 in. (457 mm) above or below the hole at ground line. In test no. MGSLS-2, similar criteria 
were used, and review of the fractured posts in the downstream end anchorage found no flaws in 
critical region of BCT posts. Additionally, the post geometry and system details were consistent 
with the CAD details and previously tested anchorages. While examination of the fractured posts 
did not indicate any issues that would have affected the strength and capacity of the end anchorage, 
the variability of wood strength still may have affected the capacity of the end anchorage.  
 
                                           (a)                                                                (b) 
Figure 44. Southern Yellow Pine (a) Tension Parallel and (b) Compression Perpendicular 
3.3.3 Vehicle trajectory 
Vehicle trajectory data was reviewed for test no. MGSLS-2 and other comparable tests to 
determine if the motion of the impacting 2270P vehicle in the failed test provided insight into the 
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failure of the downstream end anchorage. Trajectory data for test nos. MGSLS-1, LSC-1, LSC-2, 
and MGSMP-1 were used for comparison purposes. The comparisons were focused on the first 
0.150 sec after impact due to failure of the end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 at approximately 
0.140 sec.  
Review of the vehicle roll and pitch data from these five tests showed little to no difference 
through the first 0.150 sec after impact. All of the vehicles remained very stable with little to no 
roll or pitch early in the impact. Comparison of the vehicle yaw angles for all five tests is shown 
in Figure 45. Vehicle roll and pitch was minimal and showed little to no difference prior to anchor 
failure. The yaw data showed that test no. MGSLS-2 redirected the impacting vehicle more slowly 
than all tests except test no. LSC-1. The slower yaw rate for these two tests correlated with tests 
that impacted within the unsupported span of the long-span guardrail. The lack of lateral support 
of the rail led to lower redirective forces and slower vehicle yaw. While the yaw angle data denoted 
a different system response for those tests, neither the yaw data nor the vehicle roll and pitch 
indicated any potential effect on end anchorage loading or failure. 
 
Figure 45. Vehicle Yaw Motion Comparisons 
3.3.4 Rail Release from Posts 
The final parameter investigated as part of the analysis of the downstream end anchorage 
failure in test no. MGSLS-2 was release of the guardrail from the posts in the system. The MGS 
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was designed with the rail splices at the midspan between posts. This change facilitated easier 
release of the guardrail from the posts due to the bolt head only needing to disengage from a single 
ply of rail. Release of the rail from the posts prevents the rail from being pulled downward as the 
posts rotate and aids in maintaining rail height and vehicle capture. The rail release in test no. 
MGSLS-2 was reviewed to see if it differed from other similar tests. 
In test no. MGSLS-2, the rail did not release from the support posts upstream and 
downstream of impact until after failure of the downstream end anchorage except for the first 
UBSP downstream of impact. This post disengaged from the rail after it fractured. After failure of 
the downstream end anchorage, the rail released from all the posts downstream of impact due to 
the longitudinal translation of the rail. Previous tests of the MGS long-span guardrail and MGS 
with a single omitted post displayed similar rail release behavior, including test nos. MGSLS-1, 
LSC-1, LSC-2, and MGSMP-1. In these tests, the guardrail released from the posts early in the 
impact event, before 0.150 sec after impact, and was limited to posts directly adjacent to impact, 
similar to test no. MGSLS-2. In test nos. LSC-2 and MGSMP-2, the rail was released from the 
majority of the upstream posts during the test due to longitudinal rail motion. Similar behavior was 
noted on the downstream posts in test no. LSC-1 and on both the upstream and downstream posts 
of test no. MGSLS-1. Thus, rail release of the posts upstream and downstream of impact has been 
observed in several comparable tests due to longitudinal rail motion. However, this motion 
occurred much later than the anchor failure in test no. MGSLS-2, and the rail release for test no. 
MGSLS-2 was very similar to other comparable tests prior to failure of the end anchorage. As 
such, rail release was not believed to be a factor in the end anchorage failure.  
 Overall Results and Conclusions 
The analysis of the downstream end anchorage failure in test no. MGSLS-2 included 
investigation of impact points relative to the unsupported span and the end anchorages, anchorage 
loads and failure mechanisms, barrier deflection and pocketing prior to failure, post fracture 
adjacent to the unsupported span, vehicle trajectory, and other factors. These parameters were also 
compared with other similar or related tests, including test no. MGSLS-1, the MASH crash tests 
of the original MGS long span, the MGS minimum length testing, testing of the MGS with an 
omitted post, and testing of the trailing-end anchorage for the MGS. 
Results from the analysis found that system deflection and pocketing for test no. MGSLS-
2 were increased prior to the anchorage failure when compared to similar testing of the original 
MGS long span. This finding would suggest that the barrier performance was pushed closer to its 
limitations than in the previous design. However, loading of the anchorage did not appear to be 
excessive as anchor loads were similar to test no. MGSLS-1 and lower than observed in several 
previous tests of the MGS with instrumented anchorages. Examination of the BCT post that failed 
did not reveal any flaws in the post that may have reduced the post strength, nor was the behavior 
of the anchorage prior to failure significantly different when compared to other testing. Soil 
resistive forces in test no. MGSLS-2 compared favorably with previous MASH tests of the MGS, 
but soil strength comparisons from the full-scale tests of the original MGS long span, test nos. 
LSC-1 and LSC-2, were not available.  
The analysis and comparison was unable to identify a sole root cause for the anchorage 
failure in test no. MGSLS-2, but several contributing factors were identified.  
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1. The increased span length of the modified system contributed to increased system 
deflections and pocketing angles. 
2. The critical impact points selected for the evaluation of the original MGS long-span 
guardrail capacity test and test no. MGSLS-2 were different due to the increased span 
length. The impact point for test no. MGSLS-2 was closer to the end of the unsupported 
span and closer to the downstream end anchorage than any previous long span testing. This 
deviation may have contributed to increased anchor loads and some of the differences in 
barrier behavior. 
3. Review of the fracture of the breakaway posts identified differences in the release of the 
posts downstream of the unsupported span. Fracture of the breakaway posts on the 
downstream end of the unsupported span in the increased-length, MGS long-span guardrail 
occurred later with respect to the relative position of the pickup truck than those in the 
original long-span guardrail. This is partially due to the differences in the behavior of 
UBSP as compared to the CRT post and partially due to difference in soil strength. As 
noted previously, the CRT posts in the original tests displayed post fracture below grade 
and vertical splitting, which were not possible with the UBSPs. Delayed fracture of the 
breakaway post relative to the truck position contributes to increased pocketing and rail 
loading. However, it could not be determined if the difference in post fracture contributed 
directly to the failure of the downstream anchorage.  
4. The timber BCT posts used in the trailing end anchorage have a natural variation in 
strength. The posts used in the trailing-end terminal for MGSLS-2 were examined before 
and after the test and displayed no checks, knots, or other flaws that would have reduced 
the BCT post capacity. However, the natural variation of wood strength could have 
contributed to a post that was near the lower end of the typical capacity and led to the 
failure of the anchorage system.  
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4 POTENTIAL SYSTEM MODIFICATION 
While a singular cause for the anchorage failure was not identified, several potential 
recommendations were developed with respect to improving the performance of the MGS long 
span with increased span length. These potential recommendations include but are not limited to: 
1. Replacing the UBSPs with CRT posts – If the use of UBSPs contributed to the failure 
of the downstream anchorages due to differences in the breakaway behavior of the 
posts, reverting to the CRT posts used in the original MGS long-span guardrail may 
improve the system behavior and aid in preventing end anchorage failure.  
2. Extension of the system length to reduce anchorage loads – End anchor loading will 
decrease as the length of the barrier system increases. Thus, increasing the length of 
the MGS long span with an increased unsupported span length would reduce anchor 
loading and reduce the potential for the end anchorage failure. The exact extent to 
which the barrier system would need to be extended is unknown at this time, and it is 
noted that large increases in the tested system length may result in barrier lengths that 
are difficult or impractical to implement in the field.  
3. Retest the system with a proprietary steel end anchorage – Various proprietary end 
terminals and associated end anchorages exist that consist of entirely of steel 
components. Some of these systems have been evaluated under MASH test designation 
no. 3-35 in order to evaluate the capacity of the terminal and anchorage through impact 
of the 2270P vehicle at the beginning of length of need. Reevaluation of the MGS long 
span with an increased unsupported span length with one of these proprietary steel end 
anchorages could reduce the potential for anchor failure and release. 
4. Await development of the non-proprietary, steel post, trailing end terminal funded in 
Midwest States Pooled Fund Year 26 and Year 28 – A research effort is currently 
underway in the Midwest States Pooled Fund program to develop and test a steel post 
version of the trailing end anchorage used in the evaluation of the MGS long span with 
increased unsupported span length. This system may offer increased anchor capacity 
and reduce potential variability due to the use of timber posts in the current end 
anchorage. Preliminary design of this system is nearly completed and full-scale crash 
testing is planned under the Year 28 program.  
5. Redesign the bearing plate to distribute more load to the foundation tube than the BCT 
post – The failure of the end anchorage in test no. MGSLS-2 occurred through fracture 
of the final BCT post near the upper portion of the bearing plate that propagated through 
the post and released the cable anchor. Redesigning the bearing plate to distribute more 
load on the foundation tube and less load on the BCT post would reduce the potential 
for fracture of the BCT post and increase the capacity of the anchorage.  
6. Revise the long-span system to incorporate nested guardrail or other rail reinforcement 
– Incorporation of some form of rail reinforcement could reduce the rail deflection and 
pocketing that was observed in test no. MGSLS-2, and potentially reduce the loading 
of the end anchorages. This could be accomplished through the use of nested guardrail 
or some other form structural reinforcement, such as tubes.  
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7. Refine the required grading for BCT posts used in the trailing end anchorage to DS-65 
– MwRSF has been recommending and full-scale crash testing BCT posts that are SYP 
Grade No. 1 or better and contain no knots 18 in. (457 mm) above or below ground  on 
the tension face of the post. This recommendation was made to provide for more 
consistent end anchor capacity and reduce the potential for premature end anchorage 
failure. Increasing the timber grade requirement for the BCT posts in the end anchorage 
to DS-65 would potentially improve the capacity and consistency of the end anchorage 
with minimal modification to the overall barrier system.  
Further analysis of these potential improvements, selection of a preferred design, and 
evaluation of the revised barrier system through full-scale crash tests will be required in order to 
provide a MASH TL-3 compliant MGS long span with increased span length. 
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
An engineering analysis was undertaken to review the downstream end anchorage failure 
observed in test no. MGSLS-2. The analysis also compared critical aspects of the barrier 
performance with previous full-scale crash tests that had similar features or increased anchor 
loading. The analysis found that anchor load, anchor deflection, and anchor stiffness were not 
significantly different when compared to anchorages from similar tests of the MGS.  
Test no. MGSLS-2 with an increased unsupported span length demonstrated higher 
pocketing angles and rail defections than the original MGS long-span guardrail evaluated in test 
no. LSC-1, which would indicate that some potential for increased rail loading existed. It was also 
found that the UBSPs used in test no. MGSLS-2 disengaged when the truck was significantly 
closer to the post than previous long-span guardrail testing that utilized CRT posts adjacent to the 
unsupported span. The impact point for test no. MGSLS-2 was compared with other similar tests 
with respect to its proximity to the first post downstream of impact, its proximity to the first rail 
splice downstream of impact, and the distance to the downstream end anchorage, but no evidence 
was found to suggest that the impact point directly contributed to the anchor failure.  
The possibility that wood and soil variability contributed to the downstream end anchor 
failure was also investigated. Variability of the wood material used in the PCB posts was noted as 
a potential factor, but examination of the fractured posts did not indicate any issues with that would 
have affected the strength and capacity of the end anchorage. Review of static soil test data from 
test no. MGSLS-2 and comparable tests found that the soil response from test no. MGSLS-2 would 
not have been expected to produce more severe loading of the end anchorage. Comparisons of 
vehicle trajectory and rail release from the posts in test no. MGSLS-2 showed no potential for 
increased anchor loading or failure, but it did denote different system response as compared to 
previous testing.  
The results of this analysis and conclusions regarding potential causes of the anchor failure 
suggested that there was no identifiable root cause for anchor failure, but the pocketing and 
deflection suggest that barrier system may have been pushed near its limits. It was noted that 
certain factors may have contributed to the anchor failure, including increased span length, location 
of in the impact point, differences in the breakaway post behavior adjacent to the unsupported 
span, and natural variation in wood strength.  
Following the analysis, several potential design modifications were noted for improving 
the barrier system and reducing the potential for failure of the end anchorage. However, it was 
noted that further analysis of these potential improvements, selection of a preferred design, and 
evaluation of the revised barrier system through full-scale crash tests will be required to fully 
evaluate the system to MASH TL-3 criteria.   
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